Edith Cowan University

Research Online
Australian Information Security Management
Conference

Conferences, Symposia and Campus Events

12-5-2006

A Knowledge Framework for Information Security Modeling
Shuangyan Liu
City University of Hong Kong

Ching-hang Cheung
City University of Hong Kong

Lam-for Kwok
City University of Hong Kong

Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.ecu.edu.au/ism
Part of the Information Security Commons
DOI: 10.4225/75/57b65e7234771
4th Australian Information Security Management Conference, Edith Cowan University, Perth, Western Australia, 5th
December, 2006
This Conference Proceeding is posted at Research Online.
https://ro.ecu.edu.au/ism/81

A Knowledge Framework for Information Security Modeling
Shuangyan Liu, Chinghang Cheung and Lamfor Kwok
Department of Computer Science, City University of Hong Kong
jenny@cs.cityu.edu.hk, Franky.CH.Cheung@gmail.com, cslfkwok@cityu.edu.hk

Abstract
The data collection process for risk assessment highly depends on the security experience of security staffs of an
organization. It is difficult to have the right information security staff, who understands both the security
requirements and the current security state of an organization and at the same time possesses the skill to perform
risk assessment. However, a well defined knowledge model could help to describe categories of knowledge
required to guide the data collection process. In this paper, a knowledge framework is introduced, which includes
a knowledge model to define the data skeleton of the risk environment of an organization and security patterns
about relationships between threat, entity and countermeasures; and a data integration mechanism for
integrating distributed security related data into a security data repository that is specific to an organization for
information security modelling.
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INTRODUCTION
Most enterprises agree that knowledge is an essential asset for survival and success in an increasingly
competitive market; this awareness is one of the main reasons for the exponential growth of knowledge
management in the past decade [Benjamins, et. al, 1998]. Knowledge can be of any kind: tacit, documented, or
procedural. Information security knowledge is of prime importance in maintaining good information security of
an organization, especially in the field of information security risk assessment.
Risk Assessment activity involves an onerous data collection process, which includes collecting information
about assets, threats, vulnerabilities and so on. However, the competence to collect data efficiently is based on
security experience about threat and countermeasures in different areas [Landoll, 2006]. A methodology which
could help to gather security data based on previous security experience is necessary.
In this paper, a knowledge framework is presented to guide the data collection process for information security
modelling. This framework includes a knowledge model to provide detailed definitions of security knowledge
and a data integration mechanism to apply the security knowledge maintained in the model to guide the data
collection process.

INFORMATION SECURITY MODELING
Information Security Model ([Kwok et. al, 1997], [Kwok et. al, 1999], [Kwok et. al, 2004]), which accumulates
operational data and security experience, is formulated to assist the data collection process for risk analysis
studies. It aims to collect all currently available information security data, and to evolve over time by
incorporating new data.
A prototype of ISM ([Fung et. al, 2003], [Kwok et. al, 2001]) provides a directory structure to store security
documentation electronically. The electronic security documentation provides a common source of information
to a wide range of staff with information security responsibilities, and minimizes the duplication of data
collection effort.
However, this directory structure makes security data and security knowledge mixed together. It is inconvenient
to store and update security related data within an organization, and security knowledge cannot be reused and
shared in a long term for periodical risk analysis process.
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For the information security modelling, as mentioned above, our knowledge framework aims to provide a
methodology to gather updated security data that are specific to the data requirements of the data collection
process under the guidance of security knowledge that are maintained in this framework.
Overview of the Knowledge Framework
The framework mainly consists of two parts (Fig.1):
•A knowledge model; and
•A data integration mechanism.

Fig. 1. The Knowledge Framework for Information Security Modelling
Three components of the knowledge model are presented: Data Skeleton, Generic Security Patterns and
Template Instances of Security Patterns. The former two components are based on previous ISM, in which Data
Skeleton represents the data structure about the risk environment of an organization and Generic Security
Patterns depict relationships between threat, entity and countermeasures. In our study, Interface is provided to
security experts to create Template Instances of Security Patterns based on their security experiences and the
former two components in the model. The Ontology Representation in the knowledge model elaborates
definitions of the components. The benefits of using ontology representation will be discussed later.
The data integration mechanism in the framework helps to integrate distributed security related data into
Specific Security Data Repository under the guidance of security knowledge that are represented in the ontology
(details described later). Structured Matching between data requirement schema (the global schema) and source
schemas is proposed.

COMPONENTS OF THE KNOWLEDGE MODEL
Data Skeleton
The proposed data skeleton represents structure of the risk context of an organization, but will not contain any
security related data specific to an organization, which is the capacity of Specific Security Data Repository. The
skeleton includes [Anderson et. al, 1994]:
•Environment group including buildings, sites, and services, which could directly affect the operation of
an organizational information processing system and indirectly affect the data resided in it;
•System group comprising information processing systems and essential personnel which may affect the
secure operation of the systems; and

•Assets group referring to the information assets in the form of electronic data. This area aims to provide
security officers the information about the business impact of a security event. The terminate influence
of a threat can be stated as a business impact.
Generic Security Patterns
Similar to the data skeleton, generic security patterns are also based on the previous ISM, which depict patterns
of threat propagating in the above groups and patterns of measures countering the threat.
The concept for threat propagation pattern is that a threat acting on an entity may cause another threat acting on
another entity. Generic ThreatEntity relationship (TE) and TETE relationship presented in ISM [Kwok et. al,
2004] are used to express the generic security pattern of threat propagation in the model.
The definition of countermeasure pattern has two considerations: (1) an appropriate proposition of a
countermeasure to each ThreatEntity pair; (2) deployment of additional countermeasures to assure the
effectiveness of the original countermeasure. Generic ThreatEntityCountermeasure relationship (TEC) and TE
CTE relationship presented in ISM [Kwok et. al, 2004] are applied to define the generic security pattern of
countermeasure in the model.
Template Instances of Security Patterns
In fact, template instances of generic security patterns are template instances of the generic relationships
mentioned above. For example, the threat scenario “user smart card is duplicated” can be represented as an
instance of TE relationship. This instance can be assigned an identified name called “TE0001”. It has two
properties: incidentThreat and targetEntity, in which incidentThreat has the value of “duplication of user smart
card” and targetEntity has the value of “user smart card”.
Templates of generic security patterns such as TE, TETE, TEC and TECTE, indicating the required attributes
of these relationship classes (as the middle part of Fig.2), should be provided to security experts to create
template instances of security patterns (as the right part of Fig.2). The value of the required attributes should be
selected from the concepts represented in the data skeleton, which stores basic concepts of threat, entity and
countermeasures.
Template instances of generic security patterns can help generate data requirements for data integration
mechanism. Instances of concepts of threat, entity and countermeasures, could be created through data
integration mechanism that will be discussed later. They are known as common instances of security patterns in
our study.

Fig. 2. Template Instances of Security Patterns
Ontology Representation of the Components
A framebased ontology is constructed to represent the components in the knowledge model. The frames refer to
basic concepts in the ontology, e.g. classes, slots or instances. This ontology consists of a set of classes organized
in a taxonomic hierarchy. We also define slots for these classes. Instances of classes are defined by providing
specific value and additional restrictions in these slots. For example, a template instance of security pattern “TE”
could be represented as an instance of TE classes in the ontology.
After a topdown development process, a classification scheme of the ontology is formed (Table 1). The
ontology currently contains 89 classes, including classes from the top level to the bottom level.
Table 1. The Classification Schema of the Ontology
Top Level Class

Middel Level Class

Bottom Level Class

Hardware
Software
System

System Software
Application
Software

PC, Server, Workstation, Hub, Router,
Switchboard, Gateway, ...
Loader, Operating System, Device Driver,
Programming tools, ...
...

Platform

Physical Platform

Network

Physical Network, Virtual Network

User
Asset

Data

Environment

Location, Site, Building, Floor,
Passage

Room

Service

Power Supply, Communication Link, ...

Threat

Threat Type

Security

Environmental
Threat

Fire, Flood, ...

Personnel Threat

Insider Attack, ...

Network Threat

Intrusion Attack, ...

Physical Threat

Equipment Failure
Equipement/Data
Theft

Threat Tree
Defence

Countermeasure
Threat
Countermeasure

ThreatEntity Relationship (TE)
ThreatEntityThreatEntity Relationship (TETE)
ThreatEntityCountermeasure Relationship (TEC)
Relationship

IncidentTETECountermeasureResidualTETE Relationship (TETECTETE)
AssetPlatform Relationship
EntityEntity Relationship (EE)

AssetApplication Relationship
...

The use of ontology to represent the components in the knowledge model aims to help maintain a global schema
for the data integration mechanism which will be discussed later.

DATA INTEGRATION MECHANISM
Distributed Security Related Data
Security related data are entities regarding the physical and logical aspects of security. Entities of Units, Physical
Networks, and Physical Platforms are correlated to the physical aspects of security; and entities of Information
Assets, Application Systems, and Virtual Networks are related to the logical aspects of security.
An internal structure of security entities is shown in Figure 3. It describes the interrelationships between the
entities described above. Information Assets are resided in the top end of the structure, which are processed by
Application Systems. Virtual Networks host Application Systems and they themselves are hosted by Physical

Networks. Interconnected Units form the Physical Networks, which are located in Physical Platforms. Physical
Platforms are located in a Physical Environment. Details of the interrelationships are discussed in [Kwok et. al,
2001].

Fig. 3. Security Related Data
Data about these entities can be recorded and are supposed to distribute in different departments of an
organization. These data provide security officers the origins of security related data that are required for our
data integration mechanism.
In fact, security related data are commonly embedded in documentation intended for another purpose other than
documentation intended primarily for security purposes. In our study, this documentation refers to the records in
rational database.
Specific Security Data Repository
The Specific Security Data Repository in the framework (Fig. 1) stores the results of data integration
mechanism, i.e. instances of concepts as mentioned above. The concepts are the values of attributes in the
template instance of security patterns. In this paper, instances of concepts are named as common instances of
security patterns.
Security related data change quickly due to the rapidly changing risk environment. If we can dynamically and
continuously integrate data satisfying data requirement from the dispersed data sources in an organization into
the Specific Security Data Repository, accurate and updated data can be supplied for risk assessment activities.
Overview of Data Integration Mechanism
Previous studies in using ontologies in data integration suggest that it is an efficient solution to solve the problem
[Isabel et. al, 2005]. We, thus, propose a similar data integration mechanism for our framework (Fig.4), which
aims to integrate the distributed security related data into the Specific Security Data Repository, in which:
•a global schema is established as a global ontology for the knowledge model. Local ontologies of
operational data are also constructed to represent the local data sources; and
•a structured matching between the global schema and source schemas is addressed.

Fig. 4. The Architecture for Data Integration Mechanism
The Global Schema
The global schema in the mechanism is an XMLbased representation for the ontology. This global XML format
serves our data integration solution a central normalized data structure. For example, the following XML schema
defines the frames in the ontology:

<class>
<superclass>System</ superclass>
<name>Hardware</name>
<slot>Description</slot>
<slot>Vulnerability</slot>
<slot>Date</slot>
<slot>Replacement Cost</slot>
<slot>Hardware Maintenance Manual</slot>
<slot>Environmental Impact</slot>
</class>
<templateinstance>
<ofclass>EE</ofclass> (EE stands for EntityEntity Relationship)
<name>Personnel File Stored On File Server</name>
<incident>Personnel File</incident>
<target>File Server</target>
<link>Stored On</link>
</templateinstance>
…

Structured Matching between Global Schema and Source Schema
A structured mapping process between the global schema and the source schemas is proposed. Local ontology is
needed to be built before the mapping. XML schema is used to represent both the global ontology and the local
ontology in our approach (Fig.5).
Template instances of generic security patterns are defined in the global XMLbased schema. Converters of the
global schema can generate a Data Requirement Table. Each column in this table may map to the actual data
item in the local data source through the local XMLbased schema.
For instance, a Data Requirement Table with three columns including a threat (“Attacker”), its direct target entity
(“File Server”), and its indirect target entity (“Personnel File”) can be derived from the template instances in the
XMLbased global schema as shown in Figure 5.
After the Data Requirement Table is established, a semantic mapping between the elements in local XMLbased
schemas and those in global schema is needed for filling the actual data item in local data source into each
column of the Data Requirement Table. The matched elements should have the same semantic meaning to the
Data Requirement Table. For example, an element "attacker" in source schema of Network center can be
matched to the node "incidentT" in global schema that has a value of “Attacker” (Fig.5).
An automatic semantic mapping can borrow the concept of Learning Source Descriptions system (LSD), which
uses machine learning to (semi)automatically compute the semantic mappings between the local data source
schema and the global schema. Details of this mapping process can be found in [AnHai et. al, 2000]. However,
manually mapping process is also applicable for filling the Data Requirement Table.
After the integration, common instances of security patterns can be created using the data items in the Data
Requirement Table.

Fig. 5. Source Network Center and Data Center returns data that is in their local schemas, which then need to be
mapped to the global schema during data integration

APPLICATION OF THE KNOWLEDGE FRAMEWORK
After security data are integrated into the Specific Security Data Repository through the data integration
mechanism, they can be applied in several risk assessment activities. One of the activities is performing risk
simulation.
Risk simulation could help security officers to obtain an entire set of impacted entities specific to an
organization if a threat happens. This simulation includes the following tasks: (1) identify threats to an
organization; (2) demonstrate the outcome of a threat acting on one entity or multiple entities. These tasks raise
several data requirements for the data collection process, which includes preparation of threat profile,
aggregation of impacted entities.
Common instances of TE relationship and TETE relationship stored in the Specific Security Data Repository
provide the required security data for risk simulation which can be consumed by applications to visualize the
simulation results.

CONCLUSION
The knowledge framework presented in this paper provides a methodology to guide the data collection process
for risk assessment activity. It has several benefits, which mainly includes: (1) security knowledge are
maintained in a formal way for periodical information security modelling process; (2) updated security data
specific to an organization could be obtained under the guidance of security knowledge maintained in our
framework.
Prototype of the framework is under development to test the concepts of applying ontology as a global schema
for the data integration mechanism and structured matching between the global schema and source schemas. The
report of such a prototype is due shortly.
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